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Constructing the Secular: The Changing Relationship 
Between Religion and Politics in the Tibetan Exile 
Community 
This paper investigates the construction of 
secularity in the Tibetan exile community 
by examining the unfolding process of 
secularization, as well as the emergence of an 
ideology of secularism and secular democracy. 
I consider secularization in the exile society to 
be occurring in two respects. The first is in the
form of differentiation between the political 
and religious institutions, which culminated in 
the Dalai Lama’s complete devolution of his 
political powers to the elected government 
in 2011. The second is in the sense of the 
transfer and transition of political legitimacy 
from the Dalai Lama, who holds traditional-
charismatic authority, to the elected leadership 
in exile, particularly the current lay prime 
minister whose political authority lies more 
in democratic and legal-rational legitimacy. 
Secularism is understood here as a political-
philosophical ideology to be distinguished from 
the socio-political process of secularization. 
In the exile context, the term ‘secularism’ 
is translated as chöluk rimé (chos lugs 
ris med)—a neologism whose key lexical 
constituent rimé alludes to a much older 
Tibetan tradition of ‘non-sectarianism.’ 
This paper claims that a unique Tibetan 
secularism that upholds religious pluralism 
is under construction in order to negotiate 
the exigencies of political modernity, the 
preservation of Tibetan identity and unity, and 
the struggle against China. I analyze key events 
which occurred in exile in 2011—the Dalai 
Lama’s political retirement and the election 
of a lay prime minister—and argue that a 
shift t wards secular democracy is taking 
place, where the basis of political legitimacy is 
transitioning from the sovereignty of the Dalai 
Lama as a Bodhisatt a-King to one grounded in 
popular sovereignty.
Keywords: Secularism, secularization, Dalai Lama, devolution, 
democratization, Lobsang Sangay, political legitimacy, Tibetan 
exile politics, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).
Emmi Okada
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Introduction 
The Dalai Lama is today a vocal and ardent advocate of 
secularism. As paradoxical as this may seem, coming from 
a foremost Tibetan lama clad in Buddhist robes, the Dalai 
Lama explains his position in his most recent English 
book Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (2012). Here, 
he develops his case for a ‘secular ethics’ that upholds 
cherished human values common to, but not exclusively 
sourced in, individual religions. This work is intended as 
a sequel to Ancient Wisdom, Modern World: Ethics for the New 
Millennium (1999). In Beyond Religion, he continues to build 
his argument for a universal ethics which has spiritual 
underpinnings but which nevertheless sheds the language 
of a particular religion so that the ideas can be accepted by 
those of different faiths and those who follow no organized 
religion. While a patent continuity exists between the two 
works, the emphasis in the Dalai Lama’s latest volume is on 
the ‘secular’ nature of his proposed ethics. 
Apart from this latest intellectual direction by the spiritual 
leader, in recent years two other salient developments in 
the Tibetan exile-polity relating to the ‘secular’ have taken 
place. The first is the Dalai Lama’s decision in March 2011
to devolve his political powers completely to the elected 
leadership in exile. This move marked a historic break 
from the traditional form of Tibetan government (the Gan-
den Phodrang) where successive Dalai Lama incarnations 
have jointly held religious and temporal authority since 
the seventeenth century. The second is the prime-min-
isterial elections that occurred that same year, which 
saw for the first time in Tibetan history a democratically
elected lay leader to the highest executive office of the
Tibetan exile government. Do these political developments 
have anything to do with the philosophical articulation 
of ‘secular ethics’ by the Dalai Lama? Certainly no explicit 
linkage has been made. However, I argue that the intellec-
tual and political developments described above are part 
of a broader process taking place in the exile society to 
construct the ‘secular.’ 
Research on non-Western secularism(s) is still an emerging 
area, but there is growing acknowledgement that these 
must be studied on their own terms and not through the 
theoretical prisms of Western secularity (Bubandt and 
Beek 2012; Bhargava 1998, 2010b; Madan 1997; van der 
Veer 2001; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun 2010; 
McBrien and Pelkmans 2008). Talal Asad noted “although 
religion is regarded as alien to the secular, the latter is 
also seen to have generated religion” (2003: 193). That is, 
in configuring the secular, the religious is also reinvented
as a social category. The ‘secular,’ therefore, is much more 
than ‘religion’s other’ (Cady and Hurd 2010: 12) and should 
be seen as a ‘presence,’ rather than the totality of reality 
that is left behind when religion is subtracted (Taylor 2007; 
Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011: 5). Re-
cent literature takes these insights as a point of departure, 
acknowledging the mutual borrowings, constitutions and 
transformations that occur between the religious and the 
secular (Starrett 2010: 642; Van der Veer 2011: 271; Cady 
and Hurd 2010: 5; Göle, 2010: 46). 
This paper investigates the construction of secularity 
in the Tibetan exile polity and, in doing so, explores the 
mutual transformations of the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ 
domains, especially within English-language discourse 
aimed for an international audience. I understand the 
construction of secularity—that is, both secularization and 
secularism—as a form of political development by Tibetan 
exiles. It is an initiative to achieve modernity in the politi-
cal sphere through the use of their own referents, such as 
the reinvention of the term chöluk rimé (chos lugs ris med) 
discussed below. And yet this Tibetan construction of sec-
ularity is very much part of an appeal to the international 
community and their host country India, whom exiled 
Tibetans rely on for financial, moral and other kinds of
support (see Frechette 2002 for a study of these dynamics 
in Nepal). I say this process is ‘constructed’ because, while 
there is a degree of historical contingency to any social 
phenomenon, the events mentioned above reveal a high 
level of agency and conscious effort by the Dalai Lama and 
the exile leadership to refashion the relationship between 
the political and the religious. I conducted the research on 
which this article is based from June to September 2012 
in Dharamsala, India, the seat of the Tibetan exile govern-
ment, in the wake of these dramatic developments.1 
For my purpose, I shall employ the term ‘secularization’ in 
two ways. First, drawing on Casanova (1994; 2011) I adopt 
his definition of one type of secularization as institutio -
al differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, 
science and so on) from religious institutions. Within this 
process, I place special emphasis on the differentiation 
between the institution of the Dalai Lama and the exile 
government, the culmination of which is the complete 
devolution in 2011 of the temporal powers that had been 
hitherto vested in the institution of the Dalai Lama.2 The 
other two types of secularization identified by Casanova
are the decline of religious belief and practices, and the 
privatization of religion, processes which I do not believe 
are taking place among the Tibetan exile community. Sec-
ularization in the first sense is similar to the understan -
ing of Karmay (2008) who asserted that “separation of 
church and state does not imply abandoning the practices 
of the established region . . . [but rather] secures freedom 
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of religious exercise and therefore the right of personal 
choice.” This form of secularization ensures the neutrality 
of the state as well as freedom from sectarianism and reli-
gious domination. The second sense in which I employ the 
term ‘secularization’ is to denote the transfer and transi-
tion of political legitimacy3 from the Dalai Lama, a repre-
sentative of Weberian traditional-charismatic authority, 
to the elected leadership in exile, especially the elected 
prime minister, the basis of whose political authority lies 
more in democratic and legal-rational legitimacy. ‘Secular’ 
and ‘secularity’ are employed in this article as aggregate 
epistemic terms referring to both secularization and secu-
larism. I use ‘secularism’ (as opposed to ‘secularization’) to 
refer to the emic understanding of the political-philosoph-
ical ideology concerning the ‘secular.’ I will refrain from 
turning to academic definitions of secularism because I am
more interested to see how the Tibetans themselves use 
this term and what meaning they give it. 
The Tibetan neologism coined in exile to translate ‘secu-
larism’ is chöluk rimé. This is the established rendition of 
the English word as translated in the widely-used Monlam 
dictionary (see The New English-Tibetan Dictionary 2000) as 
well as the term which is in currency in political circles in 
exile. Chöluk rimé, however, carries distinct connotations 
to indicate how the Tibetans understand secularism, for 
its literal meaning is ‘non-sectarianism’ or ‘non-discrim-
ination among religions.’ Thus, rather than a denial of 
religion, secularism in exile is in fact affirmative of religion
and religious diversity, similar to the interpretation of 
secularism found in India, which has influenced this co -
munity. The very lexical rendering of secularism by the 
Tibetan diaspora suggests a different interpretive trajec-
tory to its Western counterparts. I aim to shed light on the 
way in which both secularization and secularism are being 
constructed in exile in a uniquely Tibetan way so as to ne-
gotiate the exigencies of political modernity, the preserva-
tion of Tibetan identity, and the struggle against China. 
The present study is by-and-large an analysis of the 
English language discourse on the secular that has been 
evolving since the commencement of democratization in 
exile; it is not a detailed analysis of the Tibetan-language 
debates. Both democratization and secularization are 
bound up with the exile Tibetans’ international campaign, 
and as the Dalai Lama’s English language publication of 
Beyond Religion suggests, these political processes occurring 
in Dharamsala are part of a rhetoric that intends to reach a 
global audience. The focus, therefore, is on the pronounce-
ments of the political leaders and civil society organiza-
tions in exile—both of which are highly conscious of the 
international ramifications of their internal politics.
This paper is divided broadly into two sections, focusing 
on the socio-political process of secularization in the two 
senses indicated above. The emergence of a secular ideolo-
gy in exile will be discussed in the first section and the rise
of secular democracy in the second. 
Secularization as Institutional Differentiation 
Although a conceptual distinction between the spiritual 
and the temporal existed among Tibetans prior to 1959 
(see Dreyfus 1995; Ruegg 2003, 2004), it was only in exile 
that a deliberate effort was made to separate the ‘religious’ 
and ‘secular’ spheres institutionally as part of an effort to 
achieve—and project—political modernity. What might be 
described as the signs of secularization in the exile society 
in India is concomitant with the democratization process 
that has been in motion since 1959 when the Dalai Lama 
left Tibet for exile in India. Yet this process of differen-
tiation between the religious and secular spheres does 
not necessarily equate to a decline of religious influence.
In this section, I detail some of the main features of this 
complex project of secularization, looking in particular at 
the devolution of the political authority of the office of the
Dalai Lama; the delineations as well as the continuing link-
ages between religion and politics; and Buddhist principles 
informing government institutions in exile. 
In India, the fourteenth Dalai Lama found fertile ground on 
which to build the institutions and processes of political 
modernity, for there was an intrinsic equalizing dynamic 
that operated in the shared experience of exile that served 
to shift many old hierarchies (Roemer 2008: 69, 91-92). 
After the Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959 in the wake 
of the National Uprising in Tibet, some 80,000 Tibetan refu-
gees followed him to India. That same year he established 
the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—what was to 
become known as the Tibetan ‘government-in-exile’—and 
the following year created a parliament which represented 
the three Tibetan provinces (Ü-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo) 
and four major Tibetan Buddhist schools (Sakya, Nyingma, 
Kagyu, Geluk). The religious representation is a unique 
feature of the exile parliament and a means by which the 
concerns of the sizeable Tibetan monastic community are 
voiced in a political forum. The Tibetan indigenous religion 
of Bön was added to the parliamentary religious represen-
tation in 1977, and regional representatives from Europe 
and North America were included since the 1990s to 
reflect the changing demographics of the Tibetan diaspora
(TCHRD 2012: 23, 26). 
The Dalai Lama’s devolution of his political authority in 
exile has taken place in three main stages. The major par-
liamentary restructuring in 1990-1991 represented the first
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significant devolution of his temporal powers. This ended
the custom of the successive Dalai Lamas’ appointment of 
cabinet members in favor of selection by the parliament. 
The Tibetan leader also renounced his authority to endorse 
the elected parliamentary deputies. The second stage of his 
devolution took shape through the introduction of prime 
ministerial elections in 2001 and included his self-de-
clared ‘semi-retirement’ in 2003. Until then, the members 
of the cabinet had elected one among themselves as the 
prime minister for a term of one year (Tibetan Bulletin 
Sept-Oct 2001: 5). The new change meant that the people 
would directly elect the prime minister, who would then 
choose his cabinet ministers subject to approval by the 
parliament. In 2003 the Dalai Lama decided to devolve the 
majority of his substantive administrative responsibilities; 
from this point on, he began to refer to himself as being in 
‘semi-retirement,’ retaining only a handful of duties as the 
head-of-state.4 This second stage of devolution involved a 
major transfer of responsibility from the Dalai Lama to the 
elected prime minister, the exile parliament and the CTA 
offices, including the power to appoint the justice commi -
sioners, the heads of statutory bodies and the ambassadors 
of the foreign Tibet Offices Tibetan Review October 2003: 
13). It also took away the Dalai Lama’s control over the 
civil service and his right to approve major government 
decisions (Lobsang Sangay 2010: 210).
In the third stage, a decade after the inauguration of direct 
prime ministerial elections, the Dalai Lama decided to 
completely devolve his temporal powers in March 2011, 
signaling the culmination of his efforts to democratize 
the Tibetan polity. Despite protestations and proposals of 
alternatives, he refused to retain even a ceremonial role as 
head-of-state (Tibetan Review June 2011b: 6). Today, the only 
mention of the Dalai Lama in the Charter of the Tibetans-in-
Exile is in Article 1, which recognizes him as the ‘Protector 
and Symbol of Tibet and Tibetan People’ and assigns to him 
purely advisory roles, which are not binding on the elected 
leadership (see Tibetan Review July 2011c: 10). 
Although the Dalai Lama’s devolution had proceeded in a 
stepwise manner over the decades, with ten-year inter-
vals between each major reform, his full retirement from 
politics in 2011 nevertheless marked a radical departure. 
It ended a 369-year-old practice of vesting both spiritual 
and temporal authority in the Dalai Lama (CTA 2011: 19; 
Tibetan Review July 2011c: 10). The fourteenth Dalai Lama 
has told the Tibetans that the Ganden Phodrang will still 
exist as his monastic estate but that its relationship with 
politics has come to an end.5 In other words, ‘Ganden 
Phodrang’ which was the name given to the Lhasa govern-
ment in 1642, where successive Dalai Lamas had reigned as 
a cakravartin6 (wheel-turner) or Bodhisattva-King, would 
now refer solely to the religious institution and estate of 
the Dalai Lama.7 
In his speeches in March 2011, the Dalai Lama explained 
that it is in the Tibetans’ interest to “establish a sound 
system of governance” based on democratic principles and 
self-reliance while he remained able and healthy and could 
still “help resolve problems if called upon to do so” (CTA 
2011: 17). His chief concern appeared to be the avoidance 
of a situation of unpreparedness when the time comes for 
him to pass away: 
So the system of one-man rule is not good. There-
fore it is not at all good if the Dalai Lama keeps on 
holding ultimate power….The system [of the dual 
authority of the Dalai Lama] has brought many 
benefits since [the time of the fifth Dalai Lama]. Bu
now as we are in the 21st century, sooner or later 
the time for change is imminent. But if the change 
comes under the pressure of another person then 
it will be a disgrace to the former Dalai Lamas... As 
I am the fourteenth in line of that institution, it is 
most appropriate if I on my own initiative, happily 
and with pride, end the dual authority of the Dalai 
Lama. Nobody except me can make this decision 
and I have made the final decision (CTA 2011: 20
21). 
The system of the dual authority of the Dalai Lama is 
integral to the idea of chösi sungdrel (chos srid zung ‘brel), 
commonly translated as the ‘union of religion and poli-
tics.’ It is clear from the above statement that the current 
Dalai Lama views this system as anachronistic and believes 
that he should bring about its reform as the incumbent of 
that position. His speeches in March 2011 were delivered 
in Tibetan, but they were subsequently translated into 
English by the CTA and published in booklets for distribu-
tion. It can be inferred that while the reform was obviously 
an initiative for the political development of the Tibetan 
exile population, it was also carried out with an eye on the 
broader international community, which has been sup-
portive of the CTA’s democratization efforts. 
Due to the paramount moral authority the Dalai Lama 
holds among the Tibetans, his decision to devolve his po-
litical authority elicited a strong emotional response from 
the exile community. A foreign visitor who was present at 
the time of the Dalai Lama’s announcement on 10 March 
2011 (the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against 
Chinese occupation of Tibet) described the reaction of 
the Tibetans in terms of a paroxysm of lamentation, with 
many Tibetans, especially of the older generation, break-
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ing down in tears as they received the news.8 Rejecting 
implorations from the exile parliament and other sections 
of society that he reconsider his decision, the Dalai Lama 
insisted that his “decision is final” (CTA 2011: 21) and he
flatly declined the proposal to retain a ceremonial position
as the head-of-state, similar to the position of a monarch 
in a constitutional monarchy (Tibetan Review June 2011b: 6). 
Despite the initial resistance of the Tibetans to let their 
leader retire from politics, from my field research a year
after the Dalai Lama’s historic relinquishment of his tem-
poral powers, the general view towards his decision ap-
peared to be one of acceptance. For example, the President 
of the Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA) told me that, 
following the March 10 announcement, her organization 
had asked the Dalai Lama to retain his leadership as they 
considered his complete retirement to be a political step 
too big for the Tibetan community.9 Yet, with the smooth 
transition to the elected leadership over 2011-2012, she 
said that TWA now accepts the change.
The present day exile government differentiates between 
the spheres of religion and the secular much more than in 
the past. This can be viewed as a turn toward modernity 
according to Weber, who sees the basic feature of moderni-
ty as the delineation of various spheres of value—religion, 
politics, science, economy and so on (Weber 1962, 1968; 
also see Latour 1993). The Ganden Phodrang government 
in Lhasa had a sizeable ecclesiastical wing, with one half 
of the government officials constituted by monks (Petech
1973: 7-8). In comparison, in exile, the administration of 
religious affairs is confined to the responsibility of the
Department of Religion and Culture (one of the seven 
departments of the CTA), and the number of monks em-
ployed in the government has been reduced to a handful 
with the majority of the CTA employees now consisting 
of laypeople. Furthermore, unlike the Lhasa aristocracy, 
which patronized the three main Geluk monasteries (Gold-
stein 1968: 188), the CTA does not financially sponsor the
sangha.10 
Even so, the differentiation between politics and religion 
in the exile administration is by no means complete. De-
spite the Dalai Lama’s withdrawal of the Ganden Phodrang 
from the CTA, institutional linkages remain in newly 
configured forms, such as the Department of Religion and
Culture in the CTA, reserved seats for religious representa-
tives in Parliament, and in certain remnant traditions like 
the exile government’s consultation with the (unelected) 
state oracle several times a year.11 Certainly, to the more 
modern-minded Tibetans, “such appeals to non-rational 
powers through mechanisms that would not be open to 
public inspection [seem] problematic” (Lobsang Sangay 
2010: 297). The influence of religion in the exile admi -
istration can also be found in other unexpected areas. 
For example, in a recent defamation case heard by the 
Supreme Justice Commission (SJC), the losing party was 
ordered, among other things, to make amends by offering 
a certain number of butter lamps at the monastery.12 
Indeed the emergence of secularization in the form of 
institutional differentiation does not mean that religious 
influence is declining in the Tibetan polity. In fact, the
explicit project of democratization draws on Buddhist 
principles. This is evident in Article 2 of the 1963 Draft 
Constitution,13 which emphasized the principle of chösi 
sung drel by declaring Tibet to be a “unitary democratic 
State founded upon the principles laid down by the Lord 
Buddha.” It is frequently acknowledged that the monastic 
order in Tibet, which became mired in conservatism and 
ritualism, was very much bound up with the (undemo-
cratic) Lhasa government (Jamyang Norbu 1990: 14; Boyd 
2004: 33-34). It is nevertheless believed that the substance 
of Buddhist teachings upholds ‘equality’ as an overarching 
principle (Rinzin Thargyal 1997: 29). Indeed the principle 
that “all human beings are essentially equal” and have an 
“equal right to life, liberty and happiness” is what brings 
the Dalai Lama to assert that Buddhism and democracy 
are inherently compatible (Dalai Lama 1999a: 4; see also 
Dreyfus 2002: 47-48). Thus, while there is a greater institu-
tional differentiation between politics and religion in exile 
compared to the Lhasa government, Buddhist discourse 
continues to permeate exile Tibetans’ interpretations of 
their political processes and institutions. There is no single 
teleology to modernity (see Escobar 2008), and the Tibet-
ans in exile are today evolving their own distinct brand of 
secular modernity as an alternative to the political visions 
asserted by the West as well as China. They are inspired 
in part by the Indian model of secularism to reconcile 
present-day political exigencies with their long-cherished 
spiritual values. 
The 1991 Charter and Secularism
An ideology of Tibetan secularism is not only a product of 
the philosophical deliberations of the Dalai Lama in works 
such as Beyond Religion (2012) but something that has also 
developed through political debate among the exile lead-
ership. The 1963 Draft Constitution enshrined the principle 
of the chösi sungdrel. Yet, this principle became discordant 
over time because the 1963 document was drafted with 
the idea of an immanent return to Tibet. The Charter for 
the Tibetans-in-Exile, promulgated in 1991, revised the Draft 
Constitution and was specifically designed for the exile
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context. In a similar vein to its precursor, the Charter de-
scribes the exile government as a democratic welfare state 
that aspires to “preserve their ancient traditions of spiritu-
al and temporal life [chösi sungdrel], unique to the Tibetans, 
based on the principles of peace and non-violence” (Tibet 
Justice Centre 2012). However a key difference between the 
Draft Constitution and the 1991 Charter is that whereas the 
former explicitly referred to Buddhism, the latter does not 
specify a particular religion as a referent for chö (religion/
spirituality). 
Even though the term chösi sungdrel was adopted in the 
1991 Charter, it is widely believed among CTA function-
aries that in its structure and spirit, the Charter was in 
fact secular in nature from its very inception14 since the 
Charter’s earlier draft initially included the word ‘secu-
larism’ (chöluk rimé) under the specific direction of the
Dalai Lama and the document was formulated on that 
basis (Lobsang Sangay 2010: 297). When the draft came 
before the parliament, however, the term chöluk rimé was 
replaced by chösi sungdrel by majority vote. Yet, as the rest 
of the document’s text and structure remained unchanged, 
the purposive spirit of the Charter is still said to reflect
the principle of secularism, which, according to Samdhong 
Rinpoche (the first democratically elected prime minister
in exile), means there cannot be any dominant influence
by any particular religion on the lawmaking process.15 
Before turning to the parliamentary debate in 1991, it is 
worth considering the etymology and connotations of the 
two terms: chöluk rimé and chösi sungdrel. The former is 
constituted by the words chö and luk meaning ‘religious 
system’ and ri mé meaning ‘non-discrimination.’ Thus, 
the Tibetan neologism for ‘secularism’ literally means 
non-discrimination between religious systems. To fully 
appreciate this term, however, one must also be aware 
of the historical connotations of its key lexical constitu-
ent rimé, which denoted a non-sectarian and ecumenical 
movement in nineteenth-century Eastern Tibet. Some of 
the most influential proponents of the rimé tradition are 
the nineteenth-century monk-scholars, Jamyang Khyentse 
Wangpo, Jamgon Kontrul, Chokgyur Lingpa, and Mipham 
Gyatso, who were active in the Kingdom of Dégé in Kham. 
According to Smith, there were several characteristics that 
marked the non-sectarian tradition as developed by these 
scholars: a trend towards simplification, preservation of
minor lineages, a rejection of labels and a reorientation to 
Indian classics as a way to “eliminate many controversies 
that arose through variant expositions of the same text 
by different Tibetan exegetes” (Smith 2001: 246). In this 
way, rimé carries with it associations of non-sectarianism, 
ecumenism, eclecticism and non-partiality (Gardner 2006: 
112; Hartley 1997: 49), and thus the Tibetan term for ‘secu-
larism’ is one that is premised in an acceptance of religious 
pluralism.
Chösi zung drel, on the other hand, is a much older term 
which literally means ‘religion and politics’ (chösi) ‘held 
together’ (sungdrel) and is rendered variously as the union, 
conjunction, or combination of religion and politics (see 
Cüppers 2004). Under the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa, the 
chö in this term had meant nangchö (nang chos; Buddhism), 
and chösi sungdrel had in fact implied a government under 
the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism (see Ishihama 2004: 
29-30). Historically speaking, therefore, chösi sungdrel was 
less inclusive of religious diversity than rimé; but in the 
Tibetan exile polity in the twenty-first century, these co -
cepts are now being refashioned. 
At the parliamentary debate in 1991 on whether the words 
chösi sungdrel or chöluk rimé should be upheld in the Char-
ter, those who supported the former won by four votes, 
led by the monk deputy Tsering Phuntsok. The grounds of 
their arguments are summarized by Lobsang Sangay (2010: 
297):
 (1) Buddhism is an integral part of our life; whatev-
er we do in life we consult divinations and perform 
religious services for its success. Even the exile gov-
ernment performs trinchols [offerings] and asks for 
advice from the Two Red and Black Protectoresses 
[state oracles] or Buddhist deities for major activi-
ties. If we have a secular system, what will happen 
to our official oracles? Where are we going to keep
them? (2) When making any decisions, if leaders 
have to think about Buddhist philosophy and kar-
ma, there is less chance of corruption, unlike the 
practice in other countries that are solely guided 
by politics. Those who believe in religion will be 
motivated to engage in good activities because his 
religion tells him that he will earn merits if he does 
such things. Since China does not have religion, 
there is corruption, dishonesty, and oppression.16 
In this way, the driving arguments behind those who sup-
ported chösi sungdrel in the parliamentary debate were the 
defense of religious elements within traditional Tibetan 
government and the perceived risk of moral corruption 
if the Tibetans were to exclude religion from politics in a 
manner similar to the brand of secularism under Chinese 
communism. These arguments resonate with the Tibetans’ 
desire to reflect their own cultural identity upon their
political institutions—something that has not happened 
for Tibetans in China. Further, according to Samdhong Rin-
poche, the deputies in this camp felt that if the term chöluk 
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rimé was adopted, then gradually Buddhist representation 
in the parliament would be done away with and there 
would be a decline of Tibetan ‘religious culture’ as a result 
of dwindling state support for religious activities.17 
On the other side of the parliamentary debate were the 
Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche, who favored the 
inclusion of the outvoted term of chöluk rimé. Some indi-
cation of the Dalai Lama’s thinking on this issue can be 
discerned from his speech to the eleventh parliament on 
29 May 1991: 
We have used the word ‘secularism’ in our draft 
charter. Experts interpret this word differently. But 
in our charter the word is defined in Tibetan as rimé 
(it roughly means that the state will not discrimi-
nate among different religions). However, nonvio-
lence and peace, as I said earlier, are the essence of 
religion. What I normally think is that the concept 
of re-birth and a future life, and so on, as we have 
in Buddhism, may not be acceptable to all religions. 
However, I feel that all religions do believe in the 
innate goodness of human beings and that different 
religions exist to develop and strengthen this quali-
ty. Therefore, if our constitution is built on this principle, 
it, for all practical purposes, incorporates the essence of 
all religions, whether we give it the name of religion 
or not. However, if we use the word religion, we 
will be narrowing the scope of this constitution. 
On the contrary, if we use the phrase “natural and 
innate spiritual qualities of human beings,” it will 
embrace the whole of humanity. Therefore from 
this point of view also, it will ensure the dovetailing 
of spiritual and secular values. As opposed to other 
democracies, our democracy will have nonviolence 
and peace at its roots, which means we will have a 
government based on, as we often say, the combination 
of spiritual and temporal values. When we see this word 
‘secularism’ in any constitution, it sounds very appropri-
ate and good. In our case, also, it is something which we 
should seriously consider (Dalai Lama 1991: 7, empha-
sis added). 
In the excerpt above, the Dalai Lama refers to both chösi 
sungdrel and rimé favorably, which seems to confound the 
parliamentary debate that treated them as alternatives. 
Yet in this apparent paradox lies the key to understanding 
how the ideology of Tibetan secularism or chöluk rimé is 
being constructed and advocated. 
As Samdhong Rinpoche told me, while there are many dif-
ferent interpretations of the English word ‘secular,’ which 
may mean ‘absence of religion’ or even ‘anti-religion,’ the 
connotation encapsulated in chöluk rimé is “to give equal 
respect to all religions and also equal respect to nonbe-
lievers.”18 He explains that despite the insertion of chösi 
sungdrel in the Charter, institutional separation between 
religion and government can be ensured since the Charter 
does not define religion or chö.
In the Charter, nowhere is there any definition of
chö: what is religion…Only the word ‘dharma’ is 
mentioned, but what dharma?...It cannot be inter-
preted as Buddhism, but as the dharma of the chösi 
sungdrel. So among the Tibetan people, we have 
the Christians and we have Muslims, and we have a 
few non-believers. So in that way if somebody asks 
you, what is your chö, what is your dharma, in the 
‘combination’ [in the concept of chösi sungdrel] in 
the Charter, no one can properly, legally interpret 
it. It may refer to all religions. So in that way, it is 
not much different from chöluk rimé.19 
It is evident from these words of the Dalai Lama and Sam-
dhong Rinpoche that they do not advocate the identific -
tion of any one religion with a democratic government; 
and yet there appears to be a view that the “essence of all 
religions” or the “natural and innate spiritual qualities of 
human beings,” as the Dalai Lama puts it (1991: 7), should 
guide government action. Alluding to a body of values that 
are common to, but simultaneously transcend, individu-
al religions, the Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche see 
scope for reconciling chösi sungdrel with chöluk rimé within 
the context of the Charter. 
From a Western view of secularism, it would be highly 
counter-intuitive, even contradictory, to say that the 
‘union of religion and politics’ is compatible with ‘secular-
ism.’ However, this is made possible in the Tibetan under-
standing due to the essentialization of chö in the concept 
of chösi sungdrel and the meanings of non-sectarianism and 
ecumenism infused into the Tibetan notion of secularism. 
Nevertheless it should be noted that the interpretation of 
chösi sungdrel in the context of the Charter is qualitatively 
different from chösi sungdrel as previously institutionalized 
in Ganden Phodrang’s rule over central Tibet, and arguably 
some slippage in the meaning of chö has taken place. While 
the chö in chösi sungdrel had undoubtedly spelt ‘Buddhism’ 
under the Ganden Phodrang government in Lhasa, today 
chö is interpreted liberally to mean spirituality in general. 
In this way, even though the 1991 Charter enshrines the 
words chösi sungdrel and thereby appeases the support-
ers of political tradition, institutional differentiation of 
religion and politics, and the government’s freedom from 
the dominant sway of any one religion are principles that 
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underlie the interpretation of the Charter as asserted by 
the leaders who have occupied the highest echelons of 
government in exile. 
The ideology of Tibetan secularism as expounded by the 
advocates of chöluk rime strongly bears the influence of
India’s model of secularism. In fact, in Beyond Religion, 
the Dalai Lama makes a grateful attribution to India for 
providing the preferred model of secularism for Tibetans 
to follow (Dalai Lama 2012: 2-3) since this model upholds “a 
profound respect for and tolerance toward all religions” as 
well as “an inclusive and impartial attitude which includes 
non-believers” (Dalai Lama 2012: 6-9). This understanding 
of secularism clearly has the merit of maintaining unity 
among the different religious and sectarian affiliations
within the Tibetan struggle; however it also has the advan-
tage of winning the support and approval of India, the host 
country for the majority of the exiled Tibetans, and the 
country which has had the most proximate influence on
the political development of the CTA. 
Secularism as an ideology that affirms religious pluralism
(while accepting non-believers) is further strengthened by 
the concept of rimé in the Tibetan neologism for ‘secular-
ism,’ which makes a historical allusion to Dégé where the 
royal court maintained relations with multiple Buddhist 
traditions, in contrast to Ganden Phodrang which was 
dominated by the Geluk sect. It might even be said that 
the religious policy of the exile administration that strives 
to give equal representation to different monastic schools 
through reserved seats in the parliament is in fact closer to 
the policy of the Dégé court than to the Ganden Phodrang 
in Lhasa. Even in the starkly different context of exile, rimé 
is asserted as a solution to sectarian conflict (Gardner 2006:
xii), and the concept is now invoked as an ideology of soli-
darity that pervades both political and religious discourses, 
calling for unity within the diversity of Tibetan society to 
include those of different religious affiliation and of no
religion. 
Secularization as Transfer and Transition of Political 
Legitimacy 
The second sense in which I deem secularization to be 
taking place in the Tibetan exile polity is the transfer and 
transition of political legitimacy. Specifically, I refer to
the transfer of the Dalai Lama’s political authority to the 
elected leadership, and the transition in the very nature 
of political legitimacy in Tibetan society from tradition-
al-charismatic authority to democratic and legal-rational 
legitimacy.20 Though interlinked, I distinguish between 
transfer and transition, because the former suggests a shift 
in the holder of authority whereas the latter denotes a 
qualitative change in the very basis of legitimacy. Taking 
Weber’s theory of legitimacy as my point of departure,21 
I analyze secularization in terms of the occurrence of 
both in the exile polity. In this section, I also discuss how 
the two elected exile prime ministers to date have in-
voked traditional as well as legal-rational and democratic 
authority to appeal to both their Tibetan constituents and 
international supporters, all the while offering the model 
of political development achieved in exile as an alternative 
to Chinese rule in Tibet. 
The moral authority of the institution of the Dalai Lama 
is situated on a traditional-charismatic continuum, the 
precise location of which is fluid and context-dependent.
In some historical periods, the incumbent Dalai Lama’s 
legitimacy rests more on traditional authority, character-
ized by an “established belief in the sanctity of immemo-
rial traditions” (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242) and determined 
by time-honored rules and practices; in other periods, it 
is more charismatic, relying on “a certain quality of an 
individual personality” by virtue of which he is considered 
extraordinary and exceptional (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242). 
Weber says that even where charisma has been “routin-
ized” and subsumed into traditional or bureaucratic forms 
of rule, an “extraordinary event”—which would presum-
ably include the circumstances that led to the exile of 
Tibetans—can activate the dormant “revolutionary force” 
of charisma (Weber 1968: 245, 1132 & 1134). 
Although the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy is sourced in a 
mixture of traditional and charismatic authority, as he 
devolved his temporal powers to an elected leadership, 
gradually legitimacy in exile has come to assume more 
characteristics of legal-rational authority, based on a belief 
in the right of those elevated to authority under the legal-
ity of rules (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242). This turn towards 
the procedural integrity of political legitimacy is also what 
marks a shift towards secular democracy in the exile soci-
ety. I consider secularization in this sense to be ‘incipient’ 
because despite the signs of burgeoning democratic par-
ticipation and the growing importance of modern political 
processes, the two elected prime ministers to date have 
continued to invoke traditional-charismatic authority in 
some form given its tenacious hold on Tibetan society. The 
current prime minister, for instance, has explicitly claimed 
to have “both traditional and democratic legitimacy” 
(Lobsang Sangay 2011a), asserting a historical continuity 
of moral authority to appeal to the Tibetan populace, while 
simultaneously using his democratic credentials to provide 
a counterpoint to China. The ‘transition’ towards legal-ra-
tional legitimacy is thus not complete but the trend is 
unmistakably towards one of secular democracy. 
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The first elected prime minister in the Tibetan exile co -
munity was Samdhong Rinpoche, a tulku (sprul sku) or re-
incarnate lama who was enthroned as the reincarnation of 
the fourth Samdhong Rinpoche at the Geluk monastery of 
Gaden Dechenling (Samdhong Rinpoche and Roebert 2006: 
xxi). He won the first-ever direct prime ministerial ele -
tions in exile in 2001 with an overwhelming majority of 
84.54 percent of the ballot and was re-elected for a second 
term in 2006 with 90 percent of the vote. In an interview 
with Nepal-based Himal magazine, he commented in 2002 
that, “From the feedback from people who voted for me I 
gather they trust me not to disobey his Holiness. Therefore 
they have not chosen me as a great democratic leader but have 
chosen me as a faithful follower of His Holiness” (Tibetan Bulletin 
2002 Jul-Sept: 22, emphasis added). These words appearing 
in a magazine that covers news from the South Asian re-
gion may be taken as the first elected prime minister’s way
of appealing to the Tibetan diaspora in the region—partic-
ularly in Nepal where there is a large Tibetan community—
in assuring this constituent that they can expect him to act 
in accordance with the will of the Dalai Lama. 
As an avowedly “faithful follower” of the Dalai Lama, and 
a high lama of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism, 
Samdhong Rinpoche represents a political leader whose le-
gitimacy rests somewhere between the traditional-charis-
matic authority embodied by the Dalai Lama and a modern 
democratic mandate yielded by the election process (see 
also Kauffman 2011: 149). Samdhong Rinpoche’s leader-
ship thus occupies a space of political liminality, a stage of 
transition between the old and the new bases of legitima-
cy. Indeed, he draws on both spheres of moral authority in 
his speeches as illustrated by the following statement on 
Tibetan democracy: 
The model of Tibetan democracy is fundamentally 
different from the modern democratic principles. 
Ours is based on basic principles of equality of 
all sentient beings on the basis of their potential 
of unlimited development. Such equality can be 
established in the day to day living only through 
cooperation and not through competition. Compe-
tition invariably leads to a form of confrontation 
or struggle. Love and equality cannot be achieved 
through competition… Realizing the phenomena of 
human behavior, the Buddha had recommended a 
democracy free from sense of competition (Samd-
hong Rinpoche 1996: 50).
These words, which were delivered in English at the Sec-
ond International Conference of Tibet Support Groups in 
1996, unapologetically glide across political and religious 
discourses to assert a uniquely Tibetan model of democ-
racy, and are noteworthy because they demonstrate the 
transitioning of political legitimacy in process. Further, 
given the nature of his audience there (Tibet support 
groups), it was likely that both references to democracy 
and to Tibetan culture and religion were well-received. 
By contrast, Lobsang Sangay, who became the second 
elected exile prime minister in 2011 at the age of 43, rep-
resents the new generation of the Tibetan diaspora. Unlike 
many other exile leaders of an older generation, he was 
born and raised in India, and later went to the USA on a 
Fulbright fellowship to undertake doctoral studies at Har-
vard Law School. During my field research, those outside
political circles (such as university students, nursing home 
residents, sweater-sellers,22 and members of a women’s or-
ganization) frequently referred to Lobsang Sangay’s youth 
and vigor as reasons for supporting him in the elections. 
These references run parallel to a concern for the Dalai 
Lama’s old age and the exile community’s political future. 
As one woman explained why she had voted for the Har-
vard graduate: “We can show that we have a young leader 
like Lobsang Sangay to the Chinese government and that 
our struggle still continues.”23 In this way, Lobsang Sangay 
came onto the exile political scene as a source of new ideas 
and energy, but also as a force who would reinvigorate an 
old struggle. 
The prime ministerial elections in 2011 were the elections 
that attracted by far the most interest among the Tibetan 
diaspora to date. The elections held a special significance
for the exile community in that it occurred in the same 
year as the Dalai Lama’s devolution of his political powers, 
a large share of which would flow to the newly elected
prime minister. The final round of the polling occurred on
20 March 2011, just days after the Dalai Lama’s announce-
ment of his retirement. In the end, Lobsang Sangay won 
with 27,051 out of 49,189 votes (55 percent of the ballot) 
while the other candidates Tethong Tenzin Namgyal (for-
mer appointed prime minister prior to the commencement 
of direct prime-ministerial elections in 2001) received 
18,405 votes, and former Minister Tashi Wangdi, 3,173 
votes (Tibetan Review May 2011a: 6).
The increased political engagement and participation of 
the exile community in the 2011 elections is also evident 
from the number of registered24 and actual voters for the 
three prime ministerial elections since 2001 (see Table 1).25 
There appears to be a commonly shared view that, had 
the electoral rules allowed Samdhong Rinpoche to run 
for a third term, he would have enjoyed an easy victory.26 
However, because of the rule against a prime minister’s 
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incumbency for a third consecutive term and the absence 
of an inevitable favored candidate for the 2011 elections, 
there was widespread interest as to who would win the 
elections.
This interest was fanned by the new campaign style 
that Lobsang Sangay introduced to the exile communi-
ty. Sangay, who visited Tibetan diaspora communities 
in thirty countries and in remote settlements of India, 
acknowledged that he had approached the elections in 
a very different way than previous candidates (Lobsang 
Sangay 2011a). Until then, exile elections featured neither 
pre-election debate nor campaign visits and had “been 
dominated by cultural values which promote humility 
and regard self-promotion negatively” (McConnell 2011a: 
4). However, the 2011 elections, which saw 17 rounds of 
pre-election debates (see pictures27 below), proved to be 
very different. As the General Secretary of the Tibetan 
Youth Congress (TYC) recalls:
I can say that I have been in the struggle for many 
years, since I was 21 or 22 you know…I’ve seen 
things over the many years, how the elections have 
always been done...With the current Kalon Tripa 
[prime ministerial] elections, Lobsang Sangay, I 
think because of the way he is and the fact that 
he has lived abroad and went to Harvard and he 
has seen how things are done; he really went all 
out with the whole campaign thing. That was very 
interesting and a bit of a shocker I guess for many 
traditional Tibetan people… You know he actually 
did the campaign trail…[H]e visited settlements 
from north to south, east to west, and abroad. You 
name it, where the Tibetan communities were, he 
went and spoke. He did the whole nine yards really, 
if not more. And that really made the other candi-
dates also move…We heard that Tenzin Namgyal 
la [Tethong] told [Lobsang Sangay] that “You’re 
making me go” because now he should be seen that 
he is doing the campaign, right?… And people were 
interested. They wanted to know the preliminary 
results, they wanted to know who their candidates 
were, it really rocked this community in exile. It was 
such a high adrenaline kind of phase, this whole 
pre-election and the pre-preliminaries (interview 
with Tenzin Chokey, General Secretary of the TYC 
Central Executive Committee).28 
From the account of this civil society leader, the energy 
and enthusiasm generated by the 2011 prime ministeri-
al elections was novel and palpable, indicating an active 
engagement from below which suggests that the change in 
the nature of political legitimacy was not solely an initia-
tive from above. As one of the students in my focus group29 
commented, these elections constituted the “biggest 
improvement in democracy so far.”30 It is also significant
that the three final prime ministerial candidates were all
laymen, which, together with the political retirement of 
the Dalai Lama, signaled a decisive shift away from politics 
where monks had dominated the highest positions in the 
government. 
Lobsang Sangay had in fact taken a course on political 
campaigning at Harvard Kennedy School in preparation 
for the elections; though he told me that he had attempted 
to find a middle ground between his Western training and
what would be acceptable by Tibetan cultural standards, 
which place a premium on humility.31 According to him, he 
had to take care not to appear “too Americanized” or “too 
aggressive … which is not so appreciated in the Tibetan 
community” and thus resolved to “campaign without 
campaigning and ask for votes without saying” (Lobsang 
Sangay 2011a). 
Lobsang Sangay has been careful not to disregard the tra-
ditional foundations of political legitimacy in Tibetan so-
ciety. After winning the elections, he stated that although 
the Dalai Lama devolved his temporal powers, there is 
“continuation of the same political leadership” (Lobsang 
Sangay 2011c) and finds support for this claim in the fo -
lowing words of the Dalai Lama on August 8, 2011, the day 
he was inaugurated as prime minister: “When I was young, 
an elderly regent Takdrag Rinpoche handed over sikyong 
(political leadership) to me, and today I am handing over 
Year Number of 
registered voters
Number of actual 
voters
Actual voters as a percentage 
of registered voters
2001 67,376 35,184 52%
2006 72,000 32,205 44%
2011 82,000 49,184 60%
Table 1: Registered and Actual 
Voters at the Prime Ministerial 
Elections 2001-2011.
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Sikyong to young Lobsang Sangay . . . in doing this I have 
fulfilled my long-cherished goal” (Lobsang Sangay 2011b).
Lobsang Sangay elaborated: 
[T]hat is a very important historical statement 
because since 1642 till August 8th the political 
authority rested with the institution of the Dalai 
Lama, both spiritual [and] political. From the Fifth 
Dalai Lama onwards through the 6th, 7th, and 8th, 
the transition continued till 8th August. Therefore 
when he said I am handing over political leadership 
to young Lobsang Sangay he was handing over the 
political authority of the institution of Dalai Lama to the 
Kalon Tripa [prime minister], it is the continuation of 
history, the continuation of the same political authority 
of the 369 years old institution of the Dalai Lama (Lobsa-
ng Sangay 2011c, emphasis added). 
Referring to the emblems of traditional authority in Ti-
betan society, Lobsang Sangay points to the transference 
of the seal of the seventh Dalai Lama (established in 1751 
in Tibet) from the former prime minister to himself and 
explains this as signifying that “the same political author-
ity established by the 7th Dalai Lama continue[s] with 
me, the same legitimacy … continue[s] with me” (Lobsang 
Sangay 2011c). Lobsang Sangay’s assertion of the continu-
ity of traditional legitimacy is doubtlessly directed at the 
majority of Tibetans who remain loyal to the Dalai Lama in 
a bid to channel their political support to him. The English 
translation of this speech appearing on the website of the 
CTA suggests that this continuity is also something he 
wishes the international community to recognize, possibly 
in an indirect entreaty for continued assistance to the exile 
community despite the political retirement of the Dalai 
Lama who had garnered extensive support abroad. 
On the other hand, Lobsang Sangay has laid great empha-
sis on his modern democratic mandate. He has repeatedly 
burnished his democratic credentials by highlighting 
that the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region is 
not elected, and that therefore he enjoys greater political 
legitimacy even if the prime ministerial elections in exile 
were not able to fully include the Tibetans inside Tibet 
(Lobsang Sangay 2011a; 2011b). By drawing attention to his 
legal-rational and democratic authority, Lobsang Sangay 
appeals internationally to the ‘free’ world, and simultane-
ously asserts a critique of, and alternative to, Chinese rule 
in Tibet. 
Thus, the new prime minister claims to have “both tradi-
tional and democratic legitimacy” (Lobsang Sangay 2011a) 
and in so doing, he links his exile leadership to the Tibet-
ans inside Tibet in two ways. First, by asserting traditional 
legitimacy, he highlights the historical continuity of moral 
authority that lay with the past governments of the Dalai 
Lamas inside Tibet. Second, by pointing to his popular 
mandate (however incomplete), he directs attention to 
the absence of democratic legitimacy on the part of the 
communist authorities inside Tibet. With the Dalai Lama, 
who enjoys undisputed loyalty from the Tibetan people, 
now removed from the political scene, Lobsang Sangay has 
been at pains to emphasize his own legitimate standing 
among the Tibetans at large. For example, he points out 
that even though the Tibetans inside Tibet were not able to 
physically participate in the voting process, they demon-
strated their solidarity in various ways, such as by sending 
him white scarves from Tibet or by praying at monasteries, 
lighting butter-lamps and setting off firecrackers on Ele -
tion Day (Lobsang Sangay 2011a, 2011b). 
Yet despite the invocations of historical continuity, it 
should be noted that the new prime minister’s popular 
appeal is premised much more in his democratic legitima-
cy than in a straightforward transfer of the Dalai Lama’s 
traditional-charismatic authority—whatever Lobsang 
Sangay’s claims to that authority may be. The Dalai La-
ma’s own foregrounding of Lobsang Sangay’s democratic 
credentials (as a result of the election process) in his 
statements of endorsement attests to this. In fact, after the 
Dalai Lama’s congratulatory speech at the prime ministe-
rial inauguration on 8 August 2011 when he used the term 
‘sikyong’ in relation to the transfer of powers to Lobsang 
Sangay, the exile parliament unanimously adopted a res-
olution on 20 September 2012 to change the official title
for the prime minister from ‘kalon tripa’ (chief of cabinet) 
to ‘sikyong’ (political leader) (Phayul 2012). The change 
implies an effort to clarify and confine the nature of the
authority that was conferred on the new prime minister 
strictly to the political sphere. 
It is also worth recognizing that the new prime minister 
constitutes a very different object of loyalty and legitimacy 
to what the Tibetans have been used to. Despite Lobsang 
Sangay’s allusions to religious principles and symbols 
in his political speeches, he does not have the religious 
training nor bearing that his predecessors brought to their 
roles. Besides being a layperson, as a legal scholar trained 
in the United States, he has thoroughly imbibed the prin-
ciples of modern secular political thought and this dispo-
sition is plain from his academic work (see for example 
Lobsang Sangay 2003, 2004, 2010).32 His coming to power 
serves to accentuate as well as accelerate the emergent 
secularization in exile. 
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Conclusion 
To a large extent, the construction of Tibetan democracy 
and secularism has been a project imposed from above and 
in response to an international community of sponsors. 
Much of it can be traced to the efforts of the present Dalai 
Lama to democratize and modernize the exile polity and 
promote inter-sectarian unity. Yet the Dalai Lama’s secular 
ideology has not remained arcane, and my field research
revealed its internalization, to varying degrees, by differ-
ent segments of the Tibetan community. I have argued in 
this paper that unfolding in tandem with the evolution of 
a Tibetan secularism is a process of secularization in exile. 
Tracing the history of the Dalai Lama’s democratic reforms 
reveals that the withdrawal of his temporal powers from 
the government was gradual but deliberate. From the abo-
lition of the traditional diarchic system to the incremental 
devolution of his own temporal authority, at every stage, 
the Tibetan leader displayed judiciousness as he worked to 
extricate the intertwinement of religion and politics that 
characterized traditional Tibetan governance to institu-
tionally separate the two spheres. 
I have also maintained that secularization in the form of 
a transfer and transition of political legitimacy has taken 
place with the devolution of the Dalai Lama’s temporal 
powers to the elected leadership and the changes in the 
foundations of political legitimacy from traditional-charis-
matic authority to legal-rational authority and democratic 
constitutionalism. This transition is by no means complete. 
Social discourses in exile continue to waver between the 
new and the old bases of legitimacy or at times draw on 
both. Nevertheless, the degree of participation in and 
enthusiasm for the democratic process displayed by the 
Tibetan diaspora in the 2011 prime-ministerial elections 
suggests that there is a discernible shift from legitimacy 
based on the sovereignty of the Dalai Lama as a Bodhisat-
tva-King to one grounded in popular sovereignty. 
Democratization and secularization are not only processes 
to politically develop the exile society but also strategies to 
enhance the credibility of the Tibetans’ national struggle 
in the eyes of the international community as well as their 
host country India, often described as the world’s larg-
est democracy. By evolving a secularism that looks upon 
religion positively (and one that is also tolerant of the 
non-religious), the Tibetan exiles declare that they can be 
modern and religious, secular and spiritual as they take 
their national struggle and self-understanding into the 
twenty-first century
Endnotes
1. I conducted fieldwork from 29 June to 29 September
2012 in the state of Himachal Pradesh, India. For the most 
part, I stayed in Dharamsala because the hill-station serves 
as an ‘exile capital’ where most Tibetan civil society and 
media organizations are based. However, I also spent a 
fortnight in Bir, a few hours away from Dharamsala, to 
witness life in a Tibetan settlement. During the course of 
my research, I conducted 53 semi-structured interviews, 21 
informal interviews, 4 focus group discussions and spoke 
to numerous others in a conversational capacity (what I 
refer to as ‘personal communications’).
2. Some work on secularization in this first sense has been
done by Brox (2012). 
3. The closest to my usage of secularization in this 
second sense is probably the theory of Weber himself, 
which argues that societies become ‘disenchanted’ (that 
is, move away from their magical ‘enchanted’ worlds) as 
they modernize and transition to a system dominated by 
bureaucracy and legal-rational authority (Weber 1946, 
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presented as the temporal counterpart to the Buddha 
(Ruegg 2003: 366).
7. He elaborates that the “Ganden Phodrang [is] reverting 
back to its role and responsibility as being the spiritual 
head as during the time of the second, third and fourth 
Dalai Lamas” (CTA 2011, 24). Accordingly, the CTA has 
changed its Tibetan name from bö zhung gan den po drang 
chok lé nam gyel (Bod gzhung dga’ ldan pho brang phyogs las 
rnam rgyal ‘the victorious Ganden Phodrang government’) 
to ü bö mé trik dzuk (dbus bod me’i sprig ‘dzugs ‘Tibetan 
people’s central organization’)—the implication being 
that, along with his political powers, the Dalai Lama has 
withdrawn his institution (Ganden Phodrang) from the 
exile administration.
8. Personal communication from foreign visitor present 
at the March 10 ceremony in 2011 when the Dalai Lama 
publicly announced the complete devolution of his 
political powers, 2 July 2012; also see Bhuchung Sonam 
2012: 123.
9. Semi-structured interview with Tashi Dolma, President 
of Tibetan Women’s Association, 27 July 2012.
10. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor, 
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012.
11. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor, 
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012; Semi-
structured interview with Nechung oracle, 10 September 
2012.
12. Personal communication from employee of Supreme 
Justice Commission (anonymous), 20 September 2012.
13. This is a document which was designed for 
implementation upon the exiles’ return to Tibet with the 
approval of the majority of Tibetans.
14. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor, 
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012; Informal 
interview with Jampal Chosang, Election Commissioner, 29 
August 2012.
15. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong 
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.
16. Note, however, that there is no proven correlation 
between religious influence upon a government and its
lack of corruption. 
17. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong 
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.
18. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong 
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.
19. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong 
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.
20. Max Weber famously advanced his taxonomy of the 
three types of legitimate domination comprising legal-
rational authority based on a belief in the legality of rules 
and the “right of those elevated to authority under such 
rules to issue commands”; traditional authority, which rests 
on an “established belief in the sanctity of immemorial 
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority 
under them”; and charismatic authority, deriving from 
“a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber 1968:
215, 241-242). Weber maintains that these are ideal types 
that rarely exist in their pure form, and that in actuality, 
the three are combined in various ways (Weber 1968: 216). 
21. I am not the first to draw on Weber to study the
position of the Dalai Lama. Jane Ardley makes a brief 
mention of the Dalai Lama’s ‘charismatic authority’ and 
how its routinization through the democratization process 
has combined charisma with legal-rational domination 
(Ardley 2002: 86). Further, Lobsang Sangay (2004) has, in 
his previous life as an academic before he became exile 
prime minister, referred to Weberian theory in examining 
the charismatic authority of the institution of the Dalai 
Lama and its historical incumbents. There are also 
others who have applied Weber’s taxonomy of the three 
types of legitimate authority to the previous Dalai Lama 
incarnations (Smith 1996: 99; Dreyfus 1995; Michael 1982; 
French 1995). The ready applicability of Weber’s theory 
is not surprising given that Weber himself discusses the 
institution of the Dalai Lama numerous times in Economy 
and Society (1968) as an instance of charismatic authority. 
However, I propose a more extended application of Weber 
compared to existing works in that, rather than only 
focusing on the institution of the Dalai Lama, I also employ 
Weber’s taxonomy in relation to the Dalai Lama’s transfer 
of authority to the elected leadership and the transition in 
the very nature of legitimacy that is taking place in exile, 
which I link to the process of secularization. 
22. This is an exile appellation for the large numbers of 
Tibetans who engage in ‘winter business’ where wholesale 
ready-made garments are bought from factories (not just 
sweaters) and retailed along the roadside in different 
towns and cities (Thilpa Tenzin Sherab 2011: 11).
23. Focus group discussions with three Regional Tibetan 
Women’s Association (RTWA) members (two sweater 
sellers and one street vendor), 4 August 2012.
24. To be eligible to vote, the Tibetans must be 18 and over 
and must hold a ‘Green Book’, which can be obtained only 
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through payment of the voluntary ‘freedom tax’ to the CTA 
(McConnell 2009a: 346-347; McConnell 2011a: 3). Further to 
vote, the Green Book must be registered prior to the actual 
voting on Election Day.
25. These figures are compiled from Lobsang (2011a) and
figures received from the CTA Election Commissioner
(informal interview with Jampal Chosang, Election 
Commissioner, 29 August 2012).
26. Semi-structured interview with Tenzin Chokey, 
General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, 
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), 10 July 2012; semi-
structured interview with a sweater seller (anonymous), 27 
July 2012.
27. These photos have been reproduced with the kind 
permission of Chime Youngdung, Director of Tibet Support 
Office and former president of the National Democratic
Party of Tibet (NDPT).
28. Semi-structured interview with Tenzin Chokey, 
General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, 
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), 10 July 2012.
29. Focus groups are a type of ‘group interview’ requiring 
greater facilitation by the interviewer to manage more 
than one interviewee. The method is useful for eliciting 
multiple views and showing how participants in a group 
interact with one another. This focus group session, 
conducted on 24 July 2012, involved three Tibetan 
university students living in India. 
30. Focus group discussion with three university students, 
24 July 2012.
31. Semi-structured interview with Lobsang Sangay, exile 
Prime Minister, 29 August 2012. 
32. With unwitting historical irony, he wrote in 2003: 
“[the Dalai Lama] must give way politically to a popularly 
elected leader and let his office become a purely spiritual
one. There is no doubt that he enjoys the mandate of the 
Tibetan people, but if he is to lead them to full democracy 
must he not step aside and let a secular system flourish?”
(Lobsang Sangay 2003: 126). Lobsang Sangay’s own 
political stance is evidently one that advocates for secular 
leadership.
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